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The building of computable general equilibrium (CGE) models is a vigorous 
and successful branch of applied economics.  The modellers set, and generally meet, 
high technical standards, and the basic idea behind CGE is possibly important 
enough to be of Nobel quality.  The field is largely problem- not tools-driven.  That 
is, as the titles of the papers presented at the IA  TRC conference demonstrate, CGE 
models are built to answer specific and usually important policy-oriented questions, 
such as the impact of trade liberalization.  Such a focus contrasts with the often 
sterile technique- or tools-driven approach found in so much of the  work 
promulgated by the top U.S. and Canadian  schools.  One thinks, for example, of the 
near-mania for game theory that swept through the best graduate programs in the 
1980s. 
Nevertheless, the leading CGE modellers have significant intellectual capital 
tied up in their work, and perhaps cannot be relied on to always assess with absolute 
objectivity the appropriateness of CGE to the problems at hand.  I will suggest below 
that simpler or narrower research strategies may indeed often be more cost-effective. 
The basic points are, first, that the extra work required to achieve 'general' results 
may not be worthwhile if the sector or problem being focused on is small enough 
not to generate significant general equilibrium feedbacks, and, second, that rigidity 
of the specification of CGE models can impose a disfunctional theoretical straitjacket 
on the analysis of a particular industry.  A 'partial' model may better capture the 
nuances of specific market behaviour. 
The paper will deal in turn with three sets of modelling issues: the question 
of 'data'; the 'micro' problem of specifying market behaviour, and the. 'macro' issue 
of 'closing' the models in aggregate.  I will conclude with some suggestions for 
future research. The basic theme of the paper is this:  CGE modelling is essentially a 
conservative or 'neoclassical' scientific endeavour, and exhibits the strengths and 
weaknesses of neoclassicism. And as for the recent injection of apparently non-
neoclassical imperfect competition or industrial organization (IO) concepts into 
CGE, though, as an 10 specialist myself I certainly welcome this in principle, I have 
doubts about the usefulness of the practice. 
I do not claim originality for my observations, with the possible exception of 
those relating to 10 specification.  Thus, the paper is directed more towards the user 
or consumer or client of CGE models than at producers of the models.  The paper 
focuses exclusively on the use of CGE for the analysis of trade policy. -2-
2.  Data 
First point: CGE models are not 'empirical' in the usual sense.  They are, of 
course, quantitative, but the models are essentially consumers, not producers, of 
empirically tested propositions.  This is not in itself a criticis.m, but does seem that 
dealing with shortages or weaknesses of data take up much of the time and 
ingenuity of the model-builders, and certainly are not neutral with respect to results. 
Specifically, the models require three types of data. in descending order of 
apparent reliability, these are: 
(a)  national accounting data 
(b)  policy data 
(c)  elasticities 
National accounting data are those produced by official national statistical 
agencies.  They cover the nominal currency flows of output, input, consumption, 
exports, imports and so on.  I will not have to say about these data, except to note 
that some variables are better measured than others.  For example, data on trade in 
goods are much more reliable than on trade in services. Labour input is easier to 
measure than capital.  Some important economic magnitudes are not measured at 
all in the official accounts:  the value of leisure; the value of household production 
and (most) child  care; illegal activities; and accounting for environmental impacts 
and depletion of natural resources. 
Clearly, these omissions must limit the generality of general equilibrium 
models.  But they may also bias the results, if the models are somehow distorted to 
fit the available data.  I will return to this point in section 4. 
Policy data, in the present context, are mostly measures of protection of 
domestic industries from import competition and/or subsidization of exports. 
Information on tariff rates are readily available; on non-tariff barriers and subsidies 
less so, though these usually yield to the determined investigator.  However, it is 
rarely possible to plug even tariff data into a model without serious further 
processing by  explicit or implicit theoretical assumptions. 
As an important example, take the aggregation of individual commodity 
'tariff items' to get a figure for the tariff protection afforded the industry which 
produces the commodities.  Typically, there will be a range of tariff rates, including 
some set at zero. How should they be combined into a single number? 
There are at least four ways of doing this: 
(a)  take ~  arithmetic average of scheduled tariff r~tes; -3-
(b)  take a weighted average of tariff rates, with domestic production values 
as weights; 
(c)  take a weighted average of tariffs on dutiable imports with import 
values as weights; 
(d)  take import value-weighted average of tariffs on all imports (dutiable 
and duty-free). 
The listing goes in descending order of lik~ly magnitude. Methods (c) and (d) are 
most popular, since they are most simply measured, by dividing the total (over all 
the commodities assigned to the industry) value of tariff duty collected by the the 
total value of, for (c), dutiable imports, or, of all imports, for (d).  It does matter 
which method is chosen:  for Canadian manufacturing, for example, weighted 
average tariffs on dutiable imports before the implementation of the Canada-US 
Trade Agreement (CUSTA) were about 11 %; on all imports, nearer 6%.  In a model 
driven by tariff cuts, the choice of starting tariff will obviously make a major 
difference to the results. 
So which method is right? Well, none of them, in principle.  The aggregator 
should depend at least on elasticities of substitution in consumption and in 
production between the commodity items.  In practice, too, the political economy of 
tariffs is important.  If tariffs are set randomly (or for ancient historical reasons that 
no longer have any systematic relevance), then (d), which averages all tariff rates, 
including zero, might be best.  But if, however, duty-free status is only given to 
commodities which are not produced in significant quantities domestically, then 
method (c) is preferable as a measure of the protection actually granted to domestic 
industry. 
Non-tariff barriers are even trickier. If markets are competitive, and supply 
and demand elasticity estimates are available, then an unambiguous tariff-
equivalent can be calculated.  But if markets are imperfectly competitive, a tariff-
equivalent does not exist even in principle.  That is, a tariff could mimic the price 
effect of the NTB, or one of the quantity effects, but not all of them.  The situation 
needs to be explicitly modelled. 
The above illustrates a point I will make again: given finite time and 
resources, the breadth of coverage of a CGE model must come at a cost in depth and 
detail.  The analyst concerned with a specific industry or small set of industries 
should consider carefully whether the likely general equilibrium feedbacks are big 
enough to make worthwhile the loss of accuracy at the micro level. 
As  for elasticity data; inadequacies in these concerned Shoven and Whalley 
in their authoritaqve 19~  survey paper.  Most model build~rs recycle the estimates -4-
of others, though often modifying them for one reason or another)  Of course, this 
is quite understandable --large scale econometric modelling is possibly even more 
time-consuming than building CGE models. 
The best available estimates are without doubt of own-price demand 
elasticities.  Consumers, especially of household goods and services, are closest to 
fitting the pre-condition of price-taking behaviour that is needed for reliable (single-
equation) demand 'curve estimation.  But it has proven terribly difficult to get the 
data to cough-up plausible cross-price elasticities.  As for the supply side, outside of 
primary resource-based industries these cannot be estimated at all, for the very good 
reason that they do not exist under the imperfectly competitive conditions that 
typify manufacturing and service industries.  Instead, modellers build up from data 
or estimates of underlying production technologies. 
Holes in the base data can be filled by applying theoretical 'restrictions' (such 
as homogeneity), by ad hoc assumptions (eg, that demand is 'Armington'), or by 
simply plugging-in numbers that the researcher considers to be reasonable.  In 
practice, many model-builders seem to be quite ready to 'fix' estimates even when 
they 'ain't broke' -- that is, to adjust estimates without providing any critique of 
them, except perhaps some general statement about econometric elasticity estimates 
always being 'too small.' 
Such massaging of the numbers may, at the hands of an experienced and 
honorable researcher, improve them.  But there are obvious dangers that the 
model-user should keep very much in mind, especially when one of the criteria for 
settling on elasticities or other data is whether the results that they generate in the 
model are to the model-builder's liking. 
1 For example, Harris and Cox (1984, Table B2A and p178) show, for their 29 2-digit 
SIC industries, export and import price elasticities of demand for Canada. The export 
elasticities they credit to the survey of Stern, Francis and Schumacher (1976).  The 
import elasticities  are  supposedly  averages  of 4-digit  elasticities  listed  in  an 
unpublished 1981  paper by Hazledine (for which a totally inaccurate citation is given 
in the Harris-Cox, bibliography). But (i) my numbers did ~ot cover nine of the 29 
Harris-Cox industries; (ii) my numbers were themselves largely taken from Stern et 
al (ie,  were not an independent source), and (iii) the numbers actually used by 
Harris-Cox are 'adjusted' -- with no explanation - so that they are all equal to 2 or 3. -5-
3.  Micro Foundations 
In his very useful introduction to the use of CGE in agricultural policy 
analysis, Hertel (1990, p7) claims that 'well specified' CGE models have a structure 
which 'adheres strictly to standard neoclassical theory'.  The reasons given by Hertel 
for this statement are really practical rather than principled:  because neoclassicism 
provides a well-understood language of discourse, it is relatively easy for the model 
user to understand, and for the model builder to explain how results are generated. 
Quite so -- well-trained economists are intimately familiar with how 
neoclassical models work.  But what if the neoclassical model is wrong?  Perhaps 
real-world markets should not be so easy to understand. It is this issue that I will 
explore below. 
First, a definition of neoclassicism. In my book, it is the economics of perfect 
competition, meaning: 
(a)  agents optimize (consumers maximize utility; firms, profits) 
(b)  agents are small (price-takers)1 
Now, they (used to) say that no purchasing manager ever got fired for buying IBM. 
Likewise, no academic economist ever was refused tenure for writing down models 
based on assumptions (a) and (b). But some of the most interesting recent work in 
trade policy modelling has broken -- albeit somewhat half-heartedly -- from 
neoclassicism.  Before getting to this, note just how problematic can be the 
predictions generated by atomistic optimization. 
Smallness is generally taken to imply constant returns technology and free 
entry.  This means that price is determined solely in factor markets -- equal to 
average cost.  Suppose that an imported commodity that competes with domestic 
output has its 10% tariff removed..  The landed price of the import will drop by this 
amount.  What will happen to the price of the domestic substitute?  In partial 
equilibrium:  nothing; in general equilibrium, perhaps a tiny fall as factor prices 
adjust throughout the economy.  This is so no matter how closely substitutable are 
imported and domestic commodity. 
1  In his paper for the IATRC  meeting, Hertel implies a  ~efinition (1991,  pll) of 
neoclassicism that only' uses tlie optimization assumption (a).  i do not think that 
this is helpful -- too much that is fundamental changes when agents become large. 
For example, it is  in fact  quite problematic under imperfect competition to have 
firms'  pricing  representing  the  'solution  to  a  well-defined  profit maximization 
problem', and,  unemployment need  not be the result of a  'distortion,  such  as 
minimum wage legislation'. -6-
Such an inference surely offends our sense of how actual import-competing 
firms do respond to lower-price imports.  It can be avoided only by assuming the 
law-of-one-price to hold (so that domestic prices are arbitraged to follow import 
prices exactly), and assigning, perhaps arbitrarily, a fixed input to the domestic sector. 
This input earns the residual rents generated by import protection.1  This 
specification is also extreme. 
The assumption that factor market c;:ompetition prevents domestic prices 
from responding directly to import prices, apart from its inherent implausibility (as 
a general proposition), has serious implications.  Since domestic price is almost 
unchanged, the relative price of imports to domestic changes a lot, inducing a large 
shift in demand away from domestic output.  This requires adjustment of the 
exchange rate to maintain overall trade balance.  The size of the adjustment depends 
very much on the size of the demand elasticities; the net result, in a bilateral trade 
liberalization scenario such as CUSTA, can be that the country with the highest 
tariffs comes out a net loser from free trade, because of terms of trade effects 
(cf Brown and Stem, 1991). 
This 'problem' is usually blamed on the 'Armington' assumption of 
commodities differentiated in demand by their country of origin and the 'low' price 
elasticities plugged in to the Armington demand equations.  But it is perhaps more 
fundamentally attributed to the neoclassical pricing model.  With more direct and 
bigger responses by domestic firms to the landed price of their import competition, 
relative price shifts would be smaller, and so too  the shifts in demand that require 
real exchange rate adjustments. 
Alternatives to the neoclassical model are now to be found.  Interestingly, 
though, their innovation into CGE was driven not by worries about the product 
market pricing model, but by the perceived need to incorporate different production 
technology - specifically, increasing returns to scale, which many believe to typify 
modem manufacturing. Large-numbers equilibria are not sustainable under 
increasing returns, so it becomes implausible to maintain the assumption of price-
taking behaviour.  With a rather small number of firms in an industry, each must 
be aware that its actions will affect price. 
In their pioneering and famous introduction of imperfect competition into a 
CGE model of the CUSTA, Harris and Cox (1984) calculated two pricing formulas for 
each domestic Canadian industry.  One had price set as a profit-maximising markup 
on marginal costs, given a perceived elasticity of demand; the other was the 'focal 
point' price equal to the exogenous world (or US) price inclusive of the Canadian 
tariff.  The latter requires implicit collusion on the part of the domestic oligopolists, 
1  It is  not possible to  maintain both free  entry (zero profits) and perfect output 
market substitutability - price will be over-determined. -7-
and is often known in Canada as  the 'Eastman-Stykolt Hypothesis'.  It is sometimes 
also called the 'tariff limiting' price, meaning that it is the price which will just limit 
competition from imports, though in an Armington world of nationally 
differentiated products this is not accurate, since imports can occur even  if the 
domestic price is lower than the landed import price. 
In any case, Harris and Cox end up using a simple arithmetic average of the 
two price formulae.  In practice, since the perceived elasticity formula is very close to 
a constant markup rule (ie, just like a competitive price), their pricing equation 
causes about one half of a tariff cut to be matched directly by cuts in competing 
domestic output prices. 
By themselves, such cuts would not cause anything spectacular to happen --
indeed, as noted above, the market share and output shifts induced by trade 
liberalization would be smaller than in the neoclassical model because the relative 
price changes are smaller. 
So from where do Harris and Cox get their gigantic (8% of GNP; or around 
25% of tradable sector value added) efficiency gains from free trade?  The trick lies in 
retaining the neoclassical free entry assumption.  It is assumed that, just because 
efficient technologies are large-scale, they are not thereby unavailable to potential 
competitors.  So, any rents from tariff protection will induce entry, and this will 
dissipate the rents, as the domestic industry becomes 'crowded' with firms, each 
producing at sub-optimal scale.  Remove the tariff; the pricing formula gives a lower 
domestic price at which the current set of domestic firms will all be making losses, 
so that some must exit, until output per surviving firm increases enough to restore 
zero profitability. 
Thus, the tariff cut has induced a 'rectangle' of efficiency gain, covering all 
units of output, in contrast to the neoclassical 'triangles' of allocative 
improvements when only marginal units are affected.  Still, though, we are short of 
the Harris/Cox numbers.  This is where the general equilibrium effects come in: 
lower domestic costs reduce exp.ort p.rices, which increases ~port,dem:and, requiring 
a balancing increase in the exchange rate, which makes imports even cheaper than 
with just the tariff cut, which forces a further round of domestic price decreases, and 
so on.1 
The Harris/Cox mixture of imperfectly competitive product markets (price 
above marginal cost), perfectly competitive input markets (price equals average 
cost), and similar technologies with scale economies (generated simply as fixed costs 
plus constant marginal costs) has become something of a standard for modellers 
1 The mechanism is explained, and the results illustrated in a stripped-down CGE 
model, in Hazledine (1990). -8-
anxious to inject 10 concepts into CGE. Refinement has focused on the pricing 
equation.  In their paper for the IATRC symposium, Hunter, Markusen and 
Rutherford (1991) bring pricing into the 10 mainstream by assuming non-
cooperative conjectural variations.  This means that each firm, operating 
independently (non-cooperatively) of other firms, but conscious of its 
interdependence with them, will choose its price (or output) to maximize profits 
subject to the expected (conjectured) change or variation in the output of its rivals 
that would be thereby induced. 
The conjectural variations (CV)  approach seems attractively general.  It can 
encompass, as extremes, both perfectly competitive pricing and monopoly pricing. 
Pricing in between the extremes is related to the number of firms in the industry, 
which industrial organization specialists find realistic.  Although there is some 
dissent (eg, from proponents of 'contestable' markets), it is reasonable to claim that 
CV matches up with the mainstream learning in 10: in 'lumpy' industries firms do 
set prices above marginal cost, with the size of the mark-up (the degree of imperfect 
competition) dependent on 'structural' parameters such as industry demand 
elasticity and the number of firms. 
But there are problems.  Note that it is just about impossible to have the 
oligopolists' pricing behaviour represent the solution to Hertel's 'well-defined 
profit maximization problem'.  The conjectures on which firms base their output 
decisions turn out, in general, to be wrong.  This is due to the immense complexity 
of the action/reaction/  action sequence  when more than a very small number of 
firms (say, two) are involved. 
What this means is that there is an inevitable ad hoc-ness to oligopoly pricing 
models.  They must be assessed on their 'reasonableness':  does price fall if  elasticity 
increases? if costs fall?  if the number of competitors increases? The 'theoretical 
consistency' beloved of :n.eoclass~cists just is not available. But this is a price worth 
paying, in my opinion.  The point is this: in analysing firms' market behaviour, 
theoretical consistency comes at the price of inconsistency with the facts. 
Thus 1 support the basic idea of injecting 10 concepts into the modelling of 
(most) tradable goods industries.  The execution is problematic, however.  Once the 
researcher leaves the tight and narrow path of perfect competition, the modelling 
territory becomes a lot broader and less well charted.  Choice of assumption about 
pricing rule or entry behaviour makes a big difference to the results (d. Hazledine, 
1990; Hertel, 1992), but most model-builders -- certainly, most CGE modellers -- have 
little expertise or information to guide their choice. 
The particular set of assumptions favoured by Harris and Cox and others 
since them generates, in my opinion, both implausibly large macro gains-from-free-
trade numbers, and unsatisfactory micro predictions of the impacts on particular -9-
industries.  For example, Harris-Cox (1984, table 14) predict that the Canadian 
transportation equipment industry  -- already a massive exporter under near-free 
trade conditions through the AutoPact, would increase its exports to the U.S. by 
157% after general free trade was implemented! 
What goes wrong?  I expect that the problem lies in the input market 
specification, not the product market.  The pricing rules, with their general 
predictions that some but not all of a tariff cut will be passed on in lower domestic 
output prices, are reasonable, and cannot do much harm.  But free entry is not 
innocuous. It comes from the postulates, first, that oligopolies exist because scale 
economies limit the  number of firms, and, second, that the technologies that 
generate these scale economies are widely available. 
That is, all the firms in an industry have the same cost curve, and this is also 
freely available to outsiders, who therefore prevent any 'excess' profits being earned, 
just as in perfect competition.  These assumptions often result in large structural 
changes as a result of trade liberalization, with many firms forced to exit, as well as 
the hefty reductions in industry average costs, noted above. 
Now, to an empirical 10 person, this is not a readily recognizable picture of 
what actual industries look like.  Specifically, we do not observe many industries in 
which all the firms are (approximately) the same size. Instead, the typical Canadian 
manufacturing industry has two-to-four big firms, perhaps a similar number of 
medium-sized enterprises, and a 'fringe' of many small operators. 
Much of the most interesting recent work in 10 has focused on analysing 
these persistent size differential within industries (eg. Farrell and Shapiro, 1990). 
The simplest way to explain them is to endow firms with different cost curves. 
These, in tum, come from firms having different endowments of some rent-
yielding inputs, such as a superior management team, or control over raw 
materials.  Heterogeneous costs do not necessarily alter much the pricing modell, 
but they make a big difference to entry, which now must be expected to occur, if at 
all, only at the fringe, where firms with no special rent-yielding assets operate. 
Then, loss of tariff rents will not force large-scale exit, and will not, therefore, 
result in much rationalization of the industry to exploit scale economies.  Indeed, 
the story is rather anti-climactic: we are close to being back to the neoclassical 
prediction of only 'marginal' efficiency gains from trade liberalization. 
1  Indeed, under linear Cournot-Nash assumptions  (this being the most popular 
model), price is only a function of the arithmetic average of firms' costs. That is, the 
distribution does not enter the pricing formula. -10 -
If  forced to choose a single 10 model to represent behaviour in all markets, I 
would plump for the differential-cost model over free-entry.  But I believe that the 
real lesson to be learned from the flightiness of results under varying 10 
assumptions is that some fairly detailed knowledge of the actual characteristics of an 
oligopolistic industry is needed before reliable policy simulation can be undertaken. 
If these informational requirements are too severe to be satisfied in big multi-sector 
CGE models, then perhaps we should not build such models, or, at least, not rely on 
them for policy analysis. 
4.  Closure 
The G in CGE stands for 'general'.  This means that the models are supposed 
to capture all the impacts, throughout the economy, of an event such as a tariff cut. 
Specifically, models are 'closed' by requiring that the total supply of an input or 
output must equal the total demand, with whatever price and other adjustments are 
required to effect this. In contrast, partial equilibrium models take some prices as 
given, on the assumption that the industry or sector being studied is too small to 
have a significant impact on total supply or demand. 
The point to be made here is simply that there is, in practice, no such thing as 
a truly general model -- all operational models must limit the range of phenomena 
they can deal with in full generality.  The choice of closure rule is often arbitrary, 
and it can affect the results. 
We can distinguish three 'classes of closure: 
(a)  geographic/temporal limits 
(b)  market responsiveness limits 
(c)  exogenous parameters 
In turn: 
(a)  All national or regional models are obviously only 'partial' in a global 
context.  Sometimes, this is  justified by a  'small country' assumption, 
implying perfectly elastic supply or demand curves linking the country 
to the rest-of-world (RoW).  Such can have large effects.  For example, 
Harris and Cox assume an elastic supply of capital to Canada, and free 
trade results, in their model, in a huge (nearly seven-fold) increase in 
capital imports (1984,  Table  9,  p.94).  It must be doubted whether 
Canada could  actually  finance  such  inflows  without  affecting  the 
supply price of capital. 
A common heuristic way to soften the small country assumption without 
actually explicitly modelling the RoW is to assign an elasticity of supply or demand---11-
for example, a world demand elasticity for the region's exports. 
Most CGE models are 'static' (single period).  This leads to some awkward 
decisions about how to deal with decisions, such as savings and investment" 
involving inter-temporal trade-offs. Again, a heuristic behavioural rule -- such as a 
savings function -- can help make the numbers more reasonable. 
(b)  Most models  have some  'v~rtical'  quantitative constraints  imposed, 
usually, on the supply side; for example, Hunter et al  assume that the 
total labour endowment in each country is  some fixed  number.  This 
amounts to 'giving up on the market' -- ie, to imposing a limit on the 
scope of price in  encouraging supply.  The result will be an over-
estimate of the price effects of changes in demand. 
A related issue is the imposition of what could be called 'zero' constraints --
that is, the total omission of some economic activity.  Few CGE models incorporate 
illegal activity, or unpaid household production, to give two quantitatively 
significant examples.  I do not know how important are these zero constraints, but 
they might be worth thinking about. 
(c)  CGE models do not push the generally accepted limits of endogeneity. 
Notably, tastes and technologies are taken as, exogenous.  Some very 
interesting recent .  work in microeconomics  has  tried  to  explain  the 
process whereby consumer and producer technologies are fashioned:  I 
will just flag this as an issue of possible merit. -12 -
5.  Recommendations 
I will close  with a terse list of recommendations, which follow (more or less) 
from the arguments made above: 
1.  Modellers must be willing to escape from the neoclassical straitjacket. 
The seductive power of the neoclassical paradigm is no use if it drives 
you in the wrong direction, as -- I believe -- it all too often does, when 
realistic analysis of actual economies is required. 
2.  Specifically,  perfect  competition  doesn't  fit  most  markets.  But 
modelling imperfect competition is  highly non-trivial, as  there is  no 
unique model that can be plugged-in.  Careful theoretical and empirical 
analysis of the actual market(s) is required. 
3.  Also, modellers should not be so sanctimonious about grounding all 
their behavioural equations in 'rational optimizing behaviour by self-
seeking atomistic agents'.  The aggregation problem involved in using 
representative agent assumptions with aggregate data is, alone, enough 
to thoroughly mess up methodological purity.  But, as well, we have 
the limitations in the scope of modelling, noted above.  What biases 
are  introduced  by,  for  example,  'rigorously'  modelling  household 
labour supply in a framework that excludes household production? 
I am not suggesting throwing first-order conditions out the window; but, at 
least, modellers could be content to make do with rules of thumb or empirical 
regularities in situations where reliable theoretical restrictions are not forthcoming. 
4.  More time spent g~tting things right at the micro level means less time 
available for  other activities,  such as  closing  the model in general 
equilibrium.  So be it - I expect that the returns to closing a model (ie, 
making it 'general') may often be exceeded by the returns to  more 
scrupulous specification of the particular sector(s) that are the focus of 
interest. 
In closing, let me say that, despite the generally negative tone of the above 
comments, I really do believe that CGE modellers have a valid and exciting research 
program, and I look forward to seeing how they develop it over the years ahead. -13 -
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Endnotes 
1.  For example, Harris and Cox (1984, Table B2A and p178) show, for their 29 2-
digit SIC industries, export and import price elasticities of demand for Canada. 
The export elasticities they credit to the survey of Stern, Francis and 
Schumacher (1976).  The import elasticities are supposedly averages of 4-digit 
elasticities listed in an unpublished 1981 paper by Hazledine (for which a 
totally inaccurate citation is given in· the Harris-Cox bibliography).  But (i) my 
numbers did not cover nine of the 29 Harris-Cox industries; (ii) my numbers 
were themselves largely taken from Stern et al (ie, were not an independent 
source), and (iii) the numbers actually used by Harris-Cox are 'adjusted' --
with no explanation -- so that they are all equal to 2 or 3. 
2.  In his paper for the IA TRC meeting, Hertel implies a'  definition 
(1991, p11) of neoclassicism that only uses the optimization assumption (a).  I 
do not think that this is helpful -- too much that is fundamental changes 
when agents become large.  For example, it is in fact quite problematic under 
imperfect competition to have firms' pricing representing the 'solution to a 
well-defined profit maximization problem', and, unemployment need not be 
the result of a 'distortion, such as minimum wage legislation'. 
3.  It is not possible to maintain both free entry (zero profits) and perfect output 
market substitutability -- price will be over-determined. 
4.  The mechanism is explained, and the results illustrated in a stripped-down 
CGE model, in Hazledine (1990). 
5.  Indeed, under linear Cournot-Nash assumptions (this being the most popular 
mode!), price is only a function of the arithmetic average of firms' costs.  That 
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